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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal arises from a disagreement between C&S 
Wholesale Grocers, Inc./Woodbridge Logistics LLC 
(“Woodbridge”) and the Board of Trustees of the IBT Local 
863 Pension Fund (“the Board”) about the amount that 
Woodbridge should pay annually after withdrawing from the 
IBT Local 863 Pension Fund (“the Fund”) in 2011.1  At the 
time of its withdrawal from the Fund, Woodbridge was the 
largest wholesale grocery distributor by revenue in the United 
States.  The Board administers the Fund, which is a 
multiemployer pension plan2 subject to the provisions of the 
                                              
1 As of September 1, 2011, the actuarial value of Fund assets 
was $202,865,255, while the accrued benefit liabilities totaled 
almost $400 million. 
 
2 As the name suggests, a multiemployer pension plan is one 
to which multiple employers contribute, usually under 
collective bargaining agreements.  Concrete Pipe & Prods. of 
Cal., Inc. v. Contr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 
605, 605-06 (1993).  Under such a plan, employers’ 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.  Before withdrawing 
from the Fund, Woodbridge had been contributing to it 
pursuant to three collective bargaining agreements 
(“CBAs”).3   
 
As a result of amendments to ERISA in the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 
(“MPPAA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461, employers cannot 
withdraw from multiemployer pension plans without 
consequence.  Instead, they still must pay the share of the 
Fund’s total unfunded vested benefits allocable to them.  The 
parties here agree that the total amount that Woodbridge owes 
is $189,606,875.  Because Woodbridge has elected to satisfy 
this “withdrawal liability” through annual payments instead 
of a lump sum, the amount of those payments is at the heart 
of this dispute. 
 
One of the provisions added to ERISA by the MPPAA, 
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(C)(i), provides that the annual 
payments must be based on the “the highest contribution rate 
at which the employer had an obligation to contribute under 
the plan  
. . . .”  The first point of disagreement between the parties is 
the meaning of “highest contribution rate.”  The Board seeks 
to select the single highest rate from the multiple contribution 
rates established in the three CBAs under which Woodbridge 
was contributing to the Fund.  Woodbridge contends that it is 
                                                                                                     
contributions are pooled in a general fund and can be used to 
satisfy any of the plan’s obligations.  Id.  Multiemployer 
plans are advantageous to employers because of their cost and 
risk-sharing mechanisms.  Simultaneously, these plans benefit 
employees because, among other things, they are able to work 
for any of the participating employers in any covered capacity 
without losing service credit toward pension benefits.  Id. at 
606-07.   
 
3 The three CBAs are:  (1) the Warehouse CBA, (2) the 
Mechanics’ CBA, and (3) the Porters’ CBA.  Participants in 
the Fund are current and former employees in the trucking 
and warehouse industry primarily located in New Jersey.   
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responsible only for a weighted average of all of the 
contribution rates it is obligated to pay under the CBAs.  The 
second point of disagreement is whether Woodbridge’s 
annual payment should include a 10 percent surcharge that 
Woodbridge had been paying pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 
1085(e)(7)(A) before withdrawing from the Fund.  This 
subsection is part of another amendment to ERISA, the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (“PPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1085.  
The Board claims this surcharge should be included in the 
annual payment that Woodbridge owes.  Woodbridge 
disagrees. 
 
After an unsuccessful attempt at arbitration, both 
parties filed suit in the District Court.  Thereafter, the District 
Court partially granted and partially denied the parties’ cross 
motions for summary judgment.  The court ruled that the 
annual withdrawal liability payment should be based on the 
single highest contribution rate (rather than averaging the 
rates in Woodbridge’s CBAs), but should not include the 
surcharge.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the District 
Court’s order and hold that:  (1) the “highest contribution” 
rate means the single highest contribution rate established 
under any of the three CBAs, and (2) the annual payment 
does not include the 10 percent surcharge. 
 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
Congress designed ERISA to regulate both single 
employer and multiemployer private pension plans.  29 
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.  In enacting ERISA, Congress sought to 
guarantee that “if a worker has been promised a defined 
pension benefit upon retirement -- and if he has fulfilled 
whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit -- 
he actually will receive it.”  Nachman Corp. v. Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980).  As 
mentioned above, this dispute focuses on multiemployer 
plans.   
 
A significant drawback of multiemployer pension 
plans is that “the possibility of liability upon termination of a 
plan create[s] an incentive for employers to withdraw from 
weak multiemployer plans.”  Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., 
Inc. v. Contr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 605, 
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608 (1993).  When an employer withdraws from a pension 
plan before fully funding the amounts attributable to its 
employees, the plan’s contribution base is reduced and the 
remaining contributing employers have no choice but to 
absorb the higher costs through increased contribution rates.  
See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 
216 (1986).  This may jeopardize the plan’s survival because 
the remaining employers have an increased incentive to also 
withdraw. Id.  The MPPAA was enacted to mitigate the 
incentives that employers would otherwise have to withdraw 
from multiemployer pension plans mired in financial 
difficulty.  See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 608-09.   
 
Under the MPPAA, when an employer completely 
withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan, it incurs 
withdrawal liability that corresponds to the value of the 
benefits in the plan that have vested and are attributable to its 
employees.4  29 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), provides the formula 
with which a plan’s actuaries are to calculate the amount of 
this liability. 5  In short, this liability is “the employer’s 
                                              
4 A complete withdrawal is when an employer either 
“permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under 
the plan” or “permanently ceases all covered operations under 
the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1383(a). 
 
5 Section 1391(c)(3)(B) directs that an employer’s allocable 
amount of unfunded vested benefits be based on a fraction: 
(i) the numerator of which is the total amount 
required to be contributed by the employer 
under the plan for the last 5 plan years ending 
before the withdrawal, and 
 
(ii) the denominator of which is the total 
amount contributed under the plan by all 
employers for the last 5 plan years ending 
before the withdrawal, increased by any 
employer contributions owed with respect to 
earlier periods which were collected in those 
plan years, and decreased by any amount 
contributed to the plan during those plan years 
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proportionate share of the plan’s ‘unfunded vested benefits,’ 
calculated as the difference between the present value of 
vested benefits and the current value of the plan’s assets.”  
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 
717, 725 (1984) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381 and 1391 in 
explaining that the withdrawal liability is “a fixed and certain 
debt to the pension plan”).  An employer may make a one-
time payment to satisfy its entire withdrawal liability or it 
may amortize the debt in equal annual payments under 
Section 1399(c)(1)(A).6  The formula for calculating the 
amount of each of these annual payments is provided in 29 
U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(C)(i): 
 
Except as provided in subparagraph (E), the 
amount of each annual payment shall be the 
product of— 
 
(I) the average annual number of contribution 
base units for the period of 3 consecutive plan 
years, during the period of 10 consecutive plan 
years ending before the plan year in which the 
withdrawal occurs, in which the number of 
contribution base units for which the employer 
had an obligation to contribute under the plan is 
the highest, and 
 
(II) the highest contribution rate at which the 
employer had an obligation to contribute under 
the plan during the 10 plan years ending with 
the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs. 
 
The contribution base units mentioned in Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(I) are generally the compensable or paid 
                                                                                                     
by employers who withdrew from the plan 
under this section during those plan years. 
 
6 The MPPAA provides that the balance of the employer’s 
withdrawal liability is forgiven after it has made payments 
annually for 20 years.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B) (“In 
any case in which the amortization period . . . exceeds 20 
years, the employer’s liability shall be limited to the first 20 
annual payments . . . .”). 
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hours for which an employer contributes to the plan on behalf 
of its employees.  See Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916 
F.2d 85, 95 n.21 (3d Cir. 1990) (describing contribution base 
units as “e.g., hours worked, weeks worked, tons of coal”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ 
Pension Plan v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414 
(1995).  The term “obligation to contribute,” in 29 U.S.C. § 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II), is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1392(a) as an 
obligation arising either “(1) under one or more collective 
bargaining (or related) agreements, or (2) as a result of a duty 
under applicable labor-management relations law.”   
 
In 2006, Congress amended ERISA again.  It enacted 
the PPA “to protect and restore multiemployer pension plans 
in danger of being unable to meet their pension distribution 
obligations in the near future.”  Trs. of the Local 138 Pension 
Tr. Fund v. F.W. Honerkamp Co. Inc., 692 F.3d 127, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2012).  Under Section 1085(b)(2)(A), which was added 
by the PPA, a multiemployer pension plan that is less than 65 
percent funded is in “critical status.”  When a plan is in 
critical status, Section 1085(a)(2) requires the plan sponsor to 
adopt and implement a rehabilitation plan.  This rehabilitation 
plan “must set forth new schedules of reduced benefits and 
increased contributions, from which participating employers 
and unions may choose when it is time to negotiate successor 
CBAs.”  Honerkamp, 692 F.3d at 131.   
 
In addition to requiring a rehabilitation plan, the PPA 
imposes an automatic surcharge from 30 days after the 
employer has been notified that the plan is in critical status 
until the adoption of a new CBA in accordance with the 
rehabilitation plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(7)(C)-(D).  In the 
first year, the surcharge is equal to five percent of the 
contributions required under the CBA.  Id. § 1085(e)(7)(A).  
In subsequent years, the surcharge is fixed at 10 percent of 
the contributions.  Id.  Under Section 1085(e)(7)(B), 
surcharges are “due and payable on the same schedule as the 
contributions on which the surcharges are based.  Any failure 
to make a surcharge payment shall be treated as a delinquent 
contribution under [29 U.S.C. § 1145] . . ..”   
Section 1085(e)(9)(B), in turn provides that “[a]ny surcharges 
under paragraph (7) shall be disregarded in determining the 
allocation of unfunded vested benefits to an employer under 
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section 1391, except for purposes of determining the 
unfunded vested benefits attributable to an employer under 
section 1391(c)(4) or a comparable method approved under 
section 1391(c)(5).” 
 
On December 16, 2014, Congress passed the 
Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (“MPRA”).  
Pub. L. No. 113-235, Div. O, 128 Stat. 2130, 2773-2822 
(amending the PPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1084–1085 and 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 431–432, among other things).  As amended by the 
MPRA, 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(9)(B) now states: 
 
Any surcharges under subsection (e)(7) shall be 
disregarded in determining the allocation of 
unfunded vested benefits to an employer under 
section 4211 and in determining the highest 
contribution rate under section 4219(c), except 
for purposes of determining the unfunded 
vested benefits attributable to an employer 
under section 4211(c)(4) or a comparable 
method approved under section 4211(c)(5). 
 
This amendment does not affect the surcharges here as they 
accrued before December 31, 2014.  Thus, unless specifically 
noted, the statutory references and language in this opinion 
refer to ERISA as it was before the MPRA. 
 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In February 2011, Woodbridge completely withdrew 
from the Fund after closing its Northern New Jersey facilities 
for economic reasons.  The three CBAs under which 
Woodbridge contributed to the Fund established multiple 
hourly contribution rates ranging from $1.50 to $3.69 per 
hour.  Since the plan year beginning on September 1, 2008, 
the Fund had been in “critical status,” as defined by Section 
1085(b)(2)(A)(i) of the PPA.  Accordingly, Woodbridge had 
been paying the Fund a surcharge for over two years before 
withdrawing.  The surcharge was fixed at 10 percent of 
Woodbridge’s contributions by the time Woodbridge 
withdrew.   
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Once Woodbridge withdrew from the Fund, it fell to 
the Board to determine the total amount of unfunded vested 
benefits that Woodbridge owed pursuant to Section 
1391(c)(3).  The parties do not dispute that the correct amount 
is $189,606,875.  Because Woodbridge opted to make annual 
payments, rather than extinguishing the debt with a single 
payment, the Board also calculated the amount of these 
annual payments using the formula in Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i).  In interpreting “the highest contribution 
rate” mentioned in that subsection, the Board selected the 
single highest contribution rate in the CBAs.  That rate was 
$3.69 per hour established in the Warehouse CBA.  The 
Board also interpreted the text of 29 U.S.C. § 1392(a) and its 
definition of the “obligation to contribute” mentioned in 
Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) as including the surcharge that 
Woodbridge had been paying.  Thus, the Board added 10 
percent to $3.69 per hour and arrived at a total contribution 
rate of $4.06 per hour.  The resulting calculation pursuant to 
Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i) resulted in an annual withdrawal 
liability payment of $8,553,551.  This amount far exceeded 
the highest annual payment that Woodbridge had ever made 
before withdrawing from the Fund, $5,777,708. 
 
Woodbridge disputed the Board’s methodology.  It 
argued that the Board should not have used the single highest 
contribution rate in all of the CBAs or included the 10 percent 
surcharge in calculating its withdrawal liability.  Thus, the 
parties submitted the following issues to an arbitrator:7   
 
(1) Did the Fund comply with ERISA Section 
4219(c)(1)(C) [29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(C)] and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder when it 
calculated Woodbridge’s withdrawal liability 
payment schedule by taking into account the 
highest contribution rate at which Woodbridge 
was obligated to contribute to the Fund, 
                                              
7 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny dispute between 
an employer and the plan sponsor of a multiemployer plan 
concerning a determination made under sections 1381 
through 1399 of this title shall be resolved through 
arbitration.”  
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notwithstanding the fact that the last bargaining 
agreements in effect allowed lower contribution 
rates for some employee classifications? 
 
(2) Is the Fund’s inclusion of Woodbridge’s 
[automatic] surcharges in the calculation of the 
contribution rate used to determine 
Woodbridge’s withdrawal liability payment 
schedule permissible under ERISA? 
 
Bd. of Trs. of the IBT Local 863 Pension Fund v. C&S 
Wholesale Grocers Inc. Woodbridge Logistics LLC, 5 F. 
Supp. 3d 707, 713 (D.N.J. 2014) (second alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 
The arbitrator found that the term “the highest 
contribution rate” as used in Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) was 
ambiguous.  He resolved this ambiguity by consulting 
legislative history and the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation’s (“PBGC”) Opinion Letter 90-2.8  Based on 
those two sources, he ruled that the Board should have 
adopted a weighted average of the different contribution rates 
established in each of the three CBAs, instead of selecting the 
single highest contribution rate of $3.69.9  The arbitrator 
                                              
8 In that letter dated April 20, 1990, the PBGC addressed a 
situation similar to this one in which the employer was 
contributing to the multiemployer plan pursant to multiple 
CBAs containing multiple contribution rates.  (1990 WL 
260108, at *3.)  The question posed to the PBGC was 
whether, under ERISA Section 4219(c)(1)(C)(i), the Board of 
Trustees of the plan in question could use a “contract-by-
contract” approach to compute the employer’s annual 
withdrawal liability payment as “the sum of the products 
described in Section 4219(c)(1)(C)(i) computed separately for 
each of the employer’s contracts.”  Id.  The PBGC opined that 
this approach was “reasonable and consistent with the intent 
of the statute.”  Id. 
 
9 The arbitrator was also concerned that, as noted above, the 
$8,553,551 annual payment that the Board calculated was 
much greater than the highest annual payment of $5,777,708 
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rejected Woodbridge’s challenge to inclusion of the 10 
percent surcharge, reasoning that 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(7)(B) 
indicates that surcharges are contributions because they are 
treated as delinquent contributions.   He believed Section 
1085(e)(9)(B) “reinforced the conclusion that surcharges paid 
by Woodbridge should be included in the highest contribution 
rate by negative implication.”  IBT Local 863 Pension Fund, 
5 F. Supp. 3d at 715-16.   
 
Both parties filed complaints in the District Court.  
The District Court reversed both of the arbitrator’s rulings in 
an order resolving the parties’ cross motions for summary 
judgment. The court held that the single highest contribution 
rate in the three CBAs (the $3.69 per hour rate in the 
Warehouse CBA) applied.  The court concluded that Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) is plain and unambiguous in referring to a 
single contribution rate:  “the highest contribution rate at 
which the employer had an obligation to contribute under the 
plan.”  See IBT Local 863 Pension Fund, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 719 
(citing Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II)).  Accordingly, the court 
declined to rely on sources beyond the statutory text.  The 
court interpreted the statute as contemplating multiple CBAs 
in directing that the highest contribution rate be used because 
the definition of “obligation to contribute” in 29 U.S.C. § 
1392(a)(1) refers to “one or more” CBAs.  Id. at 717. 
 
The court also held that the arbitrator should not have 
included the surcharge in calculating Woodbridge’s annual 
withdrawal liability payment.  The court reasoned that the 
“obligation to contribute” under Section 1392(a)(1) included 
only amounts arising under the CBAs and the CBAs in 
question did not include the surcharge.  The court recognized 
that, under Section 1392(a)(2), the “highest contribution rate” 
is also that at which the employer had an obligation to 
contribute “as a result of a duty under applicable labor-
management relations law[.]”  It explained, however, that it 
was not aware of any such law and the Board had not argued 
that the surcharge arose under such a law.  The court also 
pointed out that, while contribution rates inform the value of 
contributions, contributions are separate from and do not 
                                                                                                     
that Woodbridge had ever made before withdrawing from the 
Fund.   
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determine contribution rates.  Thus, even if contributions and 
surcharges are one and the same, the court reasoned, the 
surcharge would not change the CBAs’ underlying 
contribution rates. 
 
This appeal and cross appeal followed. Woodbridge 
appeals the court’s decision to apply the single highest 
contribution rate provided in the CBAs, and the Board 
appeals the court’s decision to disallow the surcharge in 
calculating Woodbridge’s annual withdrawal liability 
payment.10 
 
III. THE HIGHEST CONTRIBUTION RATE 
 We begin our analysis by discussing the meaning of  
“the highest contribution rate at which the employer had an 
obligation to contribute” under Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) 
where there are multiple CBAs and multiple contribution 
                                              
10  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1401 and 1451.  The parties claim that the District Court 
had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132.  However, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(b)(2) states:  “Upon completion of the arbitration 
proceedings in favor of one of the parties, any party thereto 
may bring an action, no later than 30 days after the issuance 
of an arbitrator’s award, in an appropriate United States 
district court in accordance with section 1451 of this title to 
enforce, vacate, or modify the arbitrator’s award.”  Section 
1451(c), in turn, states:  “The district courts of the United 
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an action under this 
section without regard to the amount in controversy, except 
that State courts of competent jurisdiction shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction over an action brought by a plan 
fiduciary to collect withdrawal liability.” 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
is plenary.  See, e.g., Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 
851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).  We “apply the same standard as that 
used by the District Court.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & 
Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580-81 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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rates for different classes of employees.  As discussed above, 
the District Court selected the single rate of $3.69 per hour 
which was the highest contribution rate under any of the 
employer’s three CBAs.  See IBT Local 863 Pension Fund, 5 
F. Supp. 3d at 717-20.  The court reasoned that Section 
1392(a)(1)’s reference to “one or more collective bargaining 
(or related) agreements” shows that Congress contemplated 
the possibility of multiple CBAs in directing in Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) that the single highest contribution rate 
be used.  We agree.  Accordingly, we hold that, even where 
there are multiple contribution rates under multiple CBAs, 
Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) requires that the single highest 
rate determine the amount of an employer’s annual 
withdrawal liability payment. 
  
Woodbridge makes several unpersuasive arguments in 
support of its contrary position.  First, Woodbridge contends 
that Section 1392 has no bearing on the meaning of “highest 
contribution rate” because it contains neither the term 
“highest contribution rate,” nor “contribution rate.”  
Woodbridge’s reading is far too restrictive.  Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II), plainly refers to “the highest contribution 
rate at which the employer had an obligation to contribute 
under the plan.”  Thus, the meaning of “obligation to 
contribute” is essential to understanding this subsection.  
Section 1392(a), defines “obligation to contribute” for 
purposes of Section 1399 and other provisions of ERISA 
relating to employer withdrawals.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1392(a) 
(stating that it provides a definition“[f]or purposes of this 
part”). 
 
 Second, Woodbridge argues that there is an ambiguity 
in the statute where multiple CBAs call for different 
contribution rates.  In order to resolve this ambiguity, 
Woodbridge offers both the legislative history and the 
aforementioned PBGC Opinion Letter 90-2.  It characterizes 
the PBGC letter as endorsing a “contract-by-contract” 
approach under which its annual withdrawal liability would 
be “the sum of the products described in Section 
4219(c)(1)(C)(i) computed separately for each of the 
employer’s contracts.”  (1990 WL 260108, at *3.)  
Woodbridge argues that when both the legislative history and 
the PBGC letter are read together, they establish that the 
14 
 
Board must consider the highest contribution rate for each 
class of employees, rather than the single highest contribution 
rate overall.  Because we disagree that the statute is 
ambiguous, we are not at liberty to examine the legislative 
history and the PBGC letter.11  See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Legislative history has never been permitted to override the 
plain meaning of a statute.”). 
 
 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language 
of the statute and when the language is clear, the court “must 
enforce it according to its terms.”  Jimenez v. Quarterman, 
555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009).  A statute is “ambiguous only 
where the disputed language is ‘reasonably susceptible of 
different interpretations.’”  In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 
599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  The mention of “one or 
more collective bargaining (or related) agreements” in 
Section 1392(a) makes clear that Congress contemplated a 
situation, such as the one before us, in which there would be 
multiple CBAs.  In such a situation, Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II) expressly directs that “the highest 
contribution rate” be used.  There is no ambiguity in the 
definite article “the.”  In short, when Sections 1392 and 1399 
are read together, it is clear that Congress appreciated that an 
employer might contribute at different rates under multiple 
plans and designated “the highest” rate as the appropriate rate 
to apply in calculating annual payments of the withdrawal 
liability. 
 
 Woodbridge’s last argument is that applying only the 
single highest contribution rate will lead to an unduly harsh 
                                              
11 It is noteworthy, however, that as the District Court pointed 
out, “the PBGC did not opine that an alternative approach 
could be forced on a board against its will.”  IBT Local 863 
Pension Fund, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 718 n.5.  Indeed, the PBGC 
opined merely that a contract-by-contract approach was 
“reasonable and consistent with the intent of the statute.”  
(1990 WL 260108, at *3.)  The PBGC did not suggest that 
plan administrators are required to employ a contract-by-
contract approach in lieu of a literal application of Section 
1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II).  (1990 WL 260108, at *3.) 
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result in which its annual withdrawal liability payment will be 
greater than the annual payments it was making when it was 
participating in the plan.  We agree that that is the result but 
we do not agree that it is unduly harsh.  Moreover, we must 
enforce a statute according to its terms.  We are not at liberty 
to rewrite it to address Woodbridge’s perceived inequity.  See 
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 538 (2004) (“[W]hen 
the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the 
courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms. . . . Our 
unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’s chosen 
words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is 
longstanding.”).  In addition, as we have just noted, we do not 
agree that the higher annual contributions following 
withdrawal are necessarily inequitable or that Congress was 
unaware that this could be the result of selecting the highest 
contribution rate of multiple CBAs.  Woodbridge’s equitable 
argument ignores the fact that under Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i), 
its annual payments are capped at 20 years even if more than 
20 annual payments would be required to completely satisfy 
Woodbridge’s withdrawal liability.  Thus, Woodbridge will 
not necessarily pay more following withdrawal than it would 
have had it remained in the fund.  Yet the higher annual 
payment for 20 years clearly deters employers from 
withdrawing from multiemployer funds without fully funding 
their share of the liability. 
 
 We do not believe that Congress intended that a 
withdrawing employer pay only the amounts that would 
ordinarily be due under the pension plan.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has noted that it is “not convinced that 
MPPAA aims to make withdrawing employers pay an 
actuarially perfect fair share, namely, a set of payments in 
amounts that, when invested, would theoretically produce (on 
the plan’s actuarial assumptions) a sum precisely sufficient to 
pay (the employer’s proportional share of) a plan’s estimated 
vested future benefits.”  Milwaukee Brewery, 513 U.S. at 426.  
Features of the MPPAA, such as the statute’s forgiveness of 
de minimis amounts under Section 1389 and the waiving of 
the balance after 20 years of annual payments under Section 
1399(c)(1)(B), all indicate that Congress contemplated a 
scheme under which withdrawal payments would not 
correspond exactly to the employer’s allocable unfunded 
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amounts under the plan.  See id. (Also noting that these 
features mean that “if an employer’s normal annual 
contribution was low compared to the withdrawal charge, the 
presence or absence of withdrawal-year interest (which shows 
up at the end of the payment schedule) will make no 
difference (for the last payments will never be made).”); see 
also Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. 
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 196-97 (1997) 
(“Payments are set at a level that approximates the periodic 
contributions the employer had made before withdrawing 
from the plan. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 
IV. THE SURCHARGE 
 The remaining issue which we must resolve is whether 
“the highest contribution rate at which the employer had an 
obligation to contribute” includes the 10 percent surcharge 
imposed by Section 1085(e)(7)(A).12  As discussed above, the 
District Court concluded that the surcharge should not be 
included in the annual withdrawal liability payment.  Section 
1392(a) expands on the sources of the “obligation to 
contribute,” stating:  “the term ‘obligation to contribute’ 
means an obligation to contribute arising-- (1) under one or 
more collective bargaining (or related) agreements, or (2) as a 
result of a duty under applicable labor-management relations 
law . . . .”  Thus, we must decide if the surcharge arises under 
either the CBAs or an “applicable labor-management 
relations law.”  We conclude that the surcharge does not arise 
under either. 
 
A. The Surcharge Does Not Arise Under the CBAs 
 
 The Board argues that, because Section 1085(e)(7)(B) 
makes surcharges “due and payable on the same schedule as 
the contributions” and provides that “failure to pay a 
surcharge shall be treated as a delinquent contribution” under 
Section 1145, the “statute regards both CBA and PPA-
                                              
12 The parties do not dispute that the pension plan was in 
critical status and the surcharge is 10 percent of the 
contributions otherwise required under the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement. 
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mandated employer contributions, and their respective rates, 
in an identical manner.”  Appellant Br. 26.  Section 1145 
governs delinquent contributions and states that “[e]very 
employer who is obligated to make contributions to a 
multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the 
terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall . . . make 
such contributions in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of such plan or such agreement.”  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, “[t]he text of [29 U.S.C. § 1145] plainly 
describes the employer’s contractual obligation to make 
contributions but omits any reference to a noncontractual 
obligation.”  Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. 
v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 539, 
546 (1988).  Because surcharges are noncontractual 
obligations created by Section 1085(e)(7), they are not within 
the scope of Section 1145.  Indeed, this is precisely why 
Section 1085(e)(7)(B) is necessary to ensure that surcharges 
are treated similarly to contributions when delinquent.   
 
 In addition, the phrase “treated as” in Section 
1085(e)(7)(B) is telling.  Congress would hardly need to 
inform a plan’s actuaries that surcharges are to be “treated as” 
contributions when delinquent if surcharges and contributions 
were already identical for all purposes, including calculating 
annual withdrawal payments.  In other words, if surcharges 
were contributions already, then Section 1085(e)(7)(B) would 
be rendered redundant and meaningless.  It is well 
established, however, that “legislative enactments should not 
be construed to render their provisions mere surplusage.”  
Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 
472 (1997).  In order to give effect to Section 1085(e)(7)(B), 
surcharges cannot be treated as contributions except when 
delinquent.  Thus, the surcharge established in Section 1085 
does not arise under the CBAs. 
 
B. The Surcharge Is Not Part of the “Highest 
Contribution Rate” 
 
  Under Section 1392(a)(2), an “obligation to 
contribute” may also arise “as a result of a duty under 
applicable labor-management relations law.”  Woodbridge 
argues that the only “applicable labor-management relations 
law” is the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  The 
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Board contends that Section 1085 is also such a law.13  
Woodbridge also argues that the Board waived this argument.  
Assuming arguendo that the issue is not waived, the Board’s 
position is not persuasive because it fails to distinguish 
between contributions and contribution rates.  Even if, as the 
Board argues, the surcharge arises under the PPA and 
assuming that the PPA is an “applicable labor-management 
relations law,” the surcharge cannot be added to 
Woodbridge’s annual payments unless it is part of the highest 
contribution rate. 
 
                                              
13 Woodbridge is correct that the Supreme Court has 
concluded that the NLRA is an “applicable labor-
management relations law.”  See Advanced Lightweight 
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. at 545-46 (“[Obligation to contribute] 
is defined for the purposes of the withdrawal liability portion 
of the statute in language that unambiguously includes both 
the employer’s contractual obligations and any obligation 
imposed by the NLRA.”) (emphasis added).  The Court has 
not concluded, however, that the NLRA is the only such law 
and indeed, has suggested that the phrase “applicable labor-
management relations law” is meant generally. Cf. Bay Area 
Laundry, 522 U.S. at 196 n.1 (“An ‘obligation to contribute’ 
arises from either a collective-bargaining agreement or more 
general labor-law prescriptions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1392(a).” 
(emphasis added)).  Furthermore, nothing in ERISA suggests 
that this Court should restrict the phrase “applicable labor-
management relations law” to the NLRA.  Indeed, had 
Congress meant only the NLRA, we presume it would have 
specified that Act.  As the statutory background above makes 
clear, the PPA does address labor-management relations by 
specifying what employers must do—e.g., comply with 
rehabilitation plans, or have the default schedules imposed 
upon them—when they underfund pension plans. Cf. also 29 
U.S.C. § 1001a(a)(4)(A) (discussing congressional finding 
that “withdrawals of contributing employers from a 
multiemployer pension plan frequently result in substantially 
increased funding obligations for employers who continue to 
contribute to the plan, adversely affecting the plan, its 
participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management 
relations[.]”) (emphasis added). 
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 Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II), specifies that the annual 
payments be based on the highest contribution rate at which 
an employer has an obligation to contribute under the CBAs.  
“Contribution rate” is widely used throughout the statute, but 
never explicitly defined.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(1), 
1425(f), & 1426(c)(2).  It is clear, however, as a matter of 
common sense that contributions are distinct from 
contribution rates. As the District Court aptly explained: 
 
[T]he “contribution rates” set forth in an 
employer’s CBAs with a multiemployer 
pension plan are distinct from the 
“contributions” that the employer generally 
pays to the plan. Although the contribution rates 
help determine the total value of the 
contributions, the contributions do not 
determine the contribution rates.   
IBT Local 863 Pension Fund, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 722.  A close 
reading of ERISA further reinforces our conclusion that 
contributions are not to be conflated with contribution rates.  
For example, Section 1085(e)(3)(C)(iii) states that “[a]ny 
failure to make a contribution under a schedule of 
contribution rates provided under this subsection shall be 
treated as a delinquent contribution under section 1145 of this 
title and shall be enforceable as such.” (emphasis added).  
Were contributions the same as contribution rates, that 
provision would be redundant.  Thus, the correct question is 
whether surcharges are part of contribution rates (not whether 
they constitute contributions) and we conclude that they are 
not. 
 
 This distinction is also evident from the fact that 
contribution rates are set by CBAs while surcharges are set by 
statute.  Nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that 
surcharges, when applicable, amend the underlying terms of 
employers’ CBAs.  Yet, that is the result of considering 
surcharges as contribution rates set in the CBAs.  In fact, the 
statute distinguishes between surcharges and contribution 
rates.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(7)(B) (making 
surcharges “due and payable on the same schedule as the 
contributions on which the surcharges are based”) (emphasis 
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added); Id. § 1085(e)(7)(A) (obligating employers to pay a 
surcharge based on “10 percent of the contributions otherwise 
so required”) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, ERISA is a 
“comprehensive and reticulated” statute.  Nachman, 446 U.S. 
at 361-62 (explaining at length that Congress passed ERISA 
“following almost a decade of studying the Nation’s private 
pension plans” and making “detailed findings”).  We 
appreciate that ERISA is not a model of clarity.  It is, in fact, 
a bewilderingly complex statute.  However, despite its many 
obfuscations, it is clear that Congress intended to distinguish 
between contribution rates and contributions, and we are not 
convinced by the Board’s arguments to the contrary.   
 
 The Board notes that Section 1085(e)(9)(B) provides 
that “[a]ny surcharges under paragraph (7) shall be 
disregarded in determining the allocation of unfunded vested 
benefits to an employer” under Section 1391.  Citing Russello 
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), the Board contends 
that the negative implication of this provision is that 
surcharges should not be disregarded for any other purpose 
and, consequently, they should be factored into annual 
withdrawal liability payments.  In Russello, the Supreme 
Court explained that when Congress includes language in one 
section of a statute, but omits it in another, Congress is 
presumed to have acted intentionally.  Id. at 23.  The Board’s 
reliance on this case is misplaced, however.  As discussed 
above, surcharges are not part of the highest contribution rate 
on which the annual withdrawal liability payment is based 
under Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II).  Accordingly, when 
Congress added Section 1085(e)(9)(B), there was no need for 
it to specify that surcharges are to be excluded from 
determining the annual withdrawal liability payment.  The 
only issue before the Court was whether the calculation of 
unfunded vested benefits allocated to the employer contained 
in Section 1391 includes surcharges.  Congress needed to 
clarify that surcharges are not included in that calculation 
because some of that section’s provisions refer to “the total 
amount contributed under the plan” and “any amount 
contributed by an employer.”  In contrast, Sections 1392 and 
1399 contain the phrase “obligation to contribute.”  Thus, 
Congress provided clarification in Section 1085(e)(9)(B).  
Therefore the discussion in Russello does not advance our 
inquiry here.  
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 The Board also points to a 2008 amendment that 
changed the language of Section 1085(e)(9)(B) from “[a]ny 
surcharges . . . shall be disregarded in determining an 
employer’s withdrawal liability under section 1391 of this 
title,” 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(9)(B) (2006) (emphasis added), to 
“[a]ny surcharges . . . shall be disregarded in determining the 
allocation of unfunded vested benefits to an employer under 
section 1391 of this title,” 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(9)(B) (2008) 
(emphasis added).  The Board again relies on negative 
implication in arguing that this change reveals that surcharges 
should be included in the annual withdrawal liability 
payment.  However, the District Court’s explanation is far 
more plausible.  The court reasoned that since Section 1391 
repeatedly speaks in terms of determining the employer’s 
allocable “amount of unfunded vested benefits,” Congress 
amended Section 1085(e)(9)(B) to match this language and 
eliminate any confusion.  IBT Local 863 Pension Fund, 5 F. 
Supp. 3d at 724.  This reasoning is reinforced by the text of 
Section 1381.  That provision states: “[t]he withdrawal 
liability of an employer to a plan is the amount determined 
under [29 U.S.C. § 1391] to be the allocable amount of 
unfunded vested benefits, adjusted [in accordance with other 
provisions of ERISA.]”  In other words, an employer’s 
withdrawal liability and allocable amount of unfunded vested 
benefits are not synonymous.  It is likely that Congress 
enacted the amendment in an effort to clarify this very 
difficult statute.  
 
 The Board also points to the MPRA which, as noted 
earlier, became effective as of December 16, 2014.  It amends 
Section 1085 to require that automatic surcharges “be 
disregarded in determining the allocation of unfunded vested 
benefits to an employer under [29 U.S.C. § 1391] and in 
determining the highest contribution rate under [29 U.S.C. 
§ 1399(c)].”  29 U.S.C. § 1085(g)(2) (2014) (emphasis 
added).  The Board argues that the prospective, rather than 
retroactive, nature of the MPRA amounts to a repeal of 
existing law.  Thus, it contends that the amendment would not 
have been necessary if Congress believed that the pre-MPRA 
provisions excluded surcharges in calculating annual 
withdrawal liability payments.   
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 However, as the Supreme Court has cautioned: “we 
[must] begin with the oft-repeated warning that the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the 
intent of an earlier one.”  Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, the weight given 
subsequent legislation and whether it constitutes a 
clarification or a repeal is a context- and fact-dependent 
inquiry.  See Miss. Poultry Ass’n, Inc. v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 
293, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Although subsequent 
legislation has been characterized as being anything from of 
‘great weight’ or having ‘persuasive value,’ to being of ‘little 
assistance’ to the interpretative process, resolution of the 
proper weight to be accorded such legislation depends on the 
facts of each case.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 
 Here, because of the dearth of legislative history for 
the MPRA and lack of clear statutory language, it would be a 
hazardous venture for us to draw any conclusions from the 
enactment of the MPRA.  The Board argues that the Congress 
that enacted the MPRA included an effective date provision 
because it interpreted Section 1085(e)(9)(B) as not excluding 
surcharges from Section 1399(c)(1)(C)(i)(II)’s “highest 
contribution rate.”  Despite the Board’s arguments, “it 
[remains] the function of the courts and not the 
Legislature . . . to say what an enacted statute means.”  Pierce 
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988).  We therefore 
conclude that the District Court correctly held that the 10 
percent surcharge should not be included in Woodbridge’s 
annual payment of its withdrawal liability.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.   
  
